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CONCERTED REFUSALS TO LICENSE INTELLECTUAL  
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
Christina Bohannan and Herbert Hovenkamp* 
   
 
The Federal Circuit recently issued a patent misuse decision that has 
implications for both innovation policy and antitrust law. Unilateral refusals to 
license intellectual property rights are virtually never antitrust violations, as is true 
of most unilateral refusals to deal.
1
 The Patent Act provides that a unilateral refusal 
to license cannot constitute patent “misuse,”
2
 which is a defense to an infringement 
suit based on the patentee’s anticompetitive acts, restraints on innovation, or 
improper sequestering of the public domain.
3
 Concerted refusals to deal are treated 
much more harshly under the antitrust laws
4
 because they can facilitate collusion
5
 
or, in the case of technology, keep superior products or processes off the market.
6
 
In its en banc Princo decision a divided Federal Circuit debated whether 
                                               
* Christina Bohannan is a Professor of Law at the University of Iowa. Herbert Hovenkamp is the Ben V. & 
Dorothy Willie Professor of Law at the University of Iowa. 
1 Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908) (holding that patentee acting unilaterally has 
no duty to license acquired and unused patent). On unilateral refusals, see 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 770–74 (3d ed. 2007); on unilateral refusals to license IP rights, see HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST §13.2 (2d ed. 2010); cf. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. 
Ct. 2201, 2208 (2010) (distinguishing unilateral from concerted refusal to license trademark rights; antitrust liability 
for unilateral action is narrower and reachable only when it monopolizes). 
2 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2006). 
3 On patent misuse, see Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1474407.6. 
4 See 13 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 2201–05 (2d ed. 2005); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 1, ¶¶ 2220–23. 
5 E.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (finding antitrust violation when an association of 
newspapers employed rules restricting sale of news to non-members and obstructing admission of rivals). While the 
Supreme Court did not separately analyze facilitation of collusion, it acknowledged the disciplining role of 
combination by affirming that it “provides extra-judicial tribunals for determination and punishment of violations.” 
Id. at 19. 
6 E.g., Allied Tube, Inc. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988) (finding antitrust violation when producers of 
steel conduit agree to exclude rival’s innovative PVC conduit).  
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Congress had protected concerted refusals to license from claims of patent misuse. 
The majority rejected the dissenter’s argument that Congress had no such intent 
and then went on to hold that an alleged concerted refusal to license was not 
misuse.
7
 Princo involved a Sony/Philips joint venture to develop rewritable 
compact discs (CD-RWs). This process required working technology and also a 
“standard” that would ensure product compatibility for licensees building 
equipment.
8
 One technical problem was placing location information on the disc so 
that the stylus could find the right spot. Philips’ solution was an analog method 
claimed by the Raaymakers patent, while Sony’s was a digital method claimed by 
the Lagadec patent.
9
 
Philips and Sony agreed to use the analog method because the Lagadec 
technology was quirky and unstable.
10
 However, one claim in the Lagadec patent 
arguably covered technology in the CD-RW standard
11
, so the Lagadec patent was 
incorporated in the package license agreement as well.
12
 Philips and Sony also 
allegedly agreed that they would not license the Lagadec patent for use by third 
parties.
13
 The Lagadec digital patent was unused, except to the extent that it was 
included in the standard CD-RW package to prevent it from blocking other patents 
in that package.
14
 If two patents block each other they must be licensed together or 
the licensee will not be able to use them.
15
 
The Patent Misuse Reform Act provides that: 
 
d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or 
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed 
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of 
his having … (4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent; or 
(5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the 
patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another 
patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the 
circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant 
market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale 
                                               
7
 Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
8 Id. at 1322. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 1322, 1337. 
11 Id. at 1324. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 1325, 1326, 1331. 
14 See id. at 1324. 
15 See id. at 1325; 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1782 (3d ed., forthcoming 
2011). 
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is conditioned.16 
The dissent believed that subsection (4) protected only unilateral refusals to deal. 
The majority disagreed and, without explicitly applying the statute, concluded that 
the alleged concerted refusal to license could not be misuse. 
In its Illinois Tool Works (ITW) decision, the Supreme Court heavily relied on 
section 271(d)(5) to conclude that, just as the Patent Act requires proof of tying 
market power in a tying case, antitrust should assess the same requirement.
17
 The 
Court noted that language similar to that found in the opening of this paragraph 
referred not merely to “misuse” but also to “illegal extension of the patent right,”
18
 
a phrase that the Court associated with antitrust liability.
19
 
Blanket legality for concerted refusals to license patents, and unused patents in 
particular, would have serious implications for competition and innovation. A 
concerted refusal to license a plant or other input can facilitate collusion by 
denying resources to rivals unless they can find other sources.
20
 A concerted refusal 
to license an unused patent can go much further. Not only does it deny rivals that 
particular technology but it also prevents them from developing any technology 
independently that would infringe one or more of that patent’s claims. Someone 
wishing to develop a digital alternative to the analog technology licensed in the 
Sony/Philips package would have to invent around the Lagadec patent claims even 
though the technology claimed in that patent is not in use. 
Further, this licensing rule would not distinguish between internally developed 
patents and those acquired from the outside. A group of firms employing a 
particular technology could purchase exclusive rights in patents developed by a 
nascent rival and agree not to assign them to anyone else, thus protecting their own 
technology from competitive entry. 
The Princo majority and dissent debated whether Congress intended section 
271(d)(4) to cover concerted as well as unilateral refusals, but the legislative 
history is very thin, producing only a debate over whether noncompetition 
agreements in patent licenses amounted to concerted refusals.
21
 They should have 
looked at the status of antitrust law on the issue, however, which made unilateral 
refusals to license virtually lawful per se while often condemning concerted 
                                               
16 35 U.S.C. § 261(d)(4), (5) (2006). 
17 Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006) (“The question . . . is whether the presumption 
of market power in a patented product should survive as a matter of antitrust law despite its demise in patent law.”). 
18 Id. at 42. 
19 See id. at 34 (associating this language with the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the FTC Act). 
20 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (finding that dominant insurers forced 
reinsurers to deny coverage to rivals); E. States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914) 
(finding that lumber retailers boycotted wholesalers who were integrating vertically into retailing). 
21 Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2010); id. at 1350–51 (Dyk, J, 
dissenting). 
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refusals to license IP rights.
22
 
Of course, not every concerted refusal to license should be unlawful per se. 
They are appropriately covered by the ancillary restraints doctrine. Naked 
agreements not to license are unlawful per se, while refusals reasonably necessary 
to further joint research or production would be unlawful only if market power and 
anticompetitive effects were proven.
23
 By contrast, reading section 271(d) to 
authorize naked concerted refusals is likely to harm both competition and the 
incentive to innovate. 
 
 
 
                                               
22 E.g., United States v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1956), aff ’d per curiam, 355 U.S. 5 (1957) (finding 
that cartel of upholstery manufacturers cross-licensed and refused to license to others; per se unlawful); United 
States v. Nat’l Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff ’d, 332 U.S. 319 (1947). 
23 On the rule of reason for ancillary concerted refusals to deal, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 2210–14. 
